CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
SPECIAL REPORT
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: HOW IP.DO
HUNGARY CELEBRATESECADE OF PROGRESS"
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
HUNGARY CELEBRATESECADE OF PROGRESS"
The Hungarian Socialist Workers' (Cosveunist) Party, at its ninth congress beginningilldecade of progress" sincetroops restored Communist control In fact the Hungarianonly one to bein Eastern Europe since worldoteworthy recovery. First secretary Janos Kadar has gained foreasure of public established his own Imageoderate leader, andin thehis personal power. Persistent problems in industry and agriculture,obliged Hungary recently toong-rang* economic reform program. Tho debate over thisled the partyontinuing introspective review of Its policies, its changing role in society, and its ability to adapt to modern political trends. These are the key issues which will be discussed at the forthcoming congress.
After thewere crushedadar closely aligned himself and his associates with theand leadership of Khrushchev Hehumanizatlon" pro-gran designed to make socialism more tolerable, and initiallydepartures from ccsnjnist economic doctrine in an effort to raise the standard of living. The Hungarians today art* scarcely affluent, but they are muchoff than they were ten years
The only major exception to Kadar's moderate approach has been the recollectivizatlon of agriculture, which was decreed at the seventh party congress in Two years lateragriculture was almost coo-plotely collectivized, but the
farmars have to some degree been conciliated by offers of material incentives and permission tocultivating privateplots.
Byowever, Kadar was bockoderate course He consolidated his power through an extensive governmentalaccompanied by apurge of Stalinists. Ine declared that "he who ia not against us. It with us" and followod thatwith the introductionumber of liberal policies. Tho regime abolished class criteria for university enrol Intent, loosened restrictions on travel, limited the power of tho secret police,arge number ofprisoners, and introducedincentives to encourage higher industrial and agricultural production. evitalization
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tho party ait woll. Kadar an-no Lineon-Communist could, on the basic of ability,
occupy any positionost
in the party itself.
The eighth congress,ndorsed all major points of the policy of national reconciliation throughand reaf firmed partyfor Kadar's "middle-of-the-road* socialism. The ninthwill review those policies and recommend adjustments in the light of new trends.
ragmatic rather than doctrinaire approach to theof Hungary's particularthe regime gradually haseasure of acceptance from an apathetic population.
T.iis was illustrated by the order which prevailed betweenctober andovember this year--the tenth anniversary of the revolt. The regime had approved special bus and streetcaron routes near publicin Budapest, and many people visited graves during the period. There was no otherpublic reaction,even though the continued presence of soviet troops onsoil servesonstant reminder of6 intervention.
Culture and Religion
onsiderablyof cultural freedom has been allowed) outspoken writers and other Intellectuals are seldom penalized for the publicof their views. The regime relies primarily on economicto limit liberalhe intelligentsia, content with the lioeraladar's is patientlymore freely effective public opinion" to develop.
Accordinglandestine source, the politburo in5esolutionfor the developmentew generation of young intellectuals. The resolution instructs thecciarnittee of the Communist Youth League, in collaboration with the universities, toa "partyithout regard to political past or class origin, with offers of material advantage and rapid careerthe regime hopes to enroll gifted young intellectualswo-year political course sponsored by the central com-suttee
Although Kadar reducedon the Catholic Churchafter the revolt, the liberal trend has not extended to church-state relations. 4 tho rogime signed an agreement with the Vatican which authorized the appointment of new bishops. the regime has obstructed implementation of the agreentant, and probably will continue to do so. ajor irritant in church-state relations is still Cardinal Kindssenty who* despite repeated attempts to negotiate aremains "the guest upstairs" in the US "legation in liudapest.
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Electoral Reform Bill
A new electoral reform bill, adoptedpecial session of the National Assembly earlier this month, is the latest gesture toward liberalization made by the Xader regime. Designed to inject "socialistntoelections, the bill would break down the county list* into small constituencies in which the voters would be likely to know the candidates. Parliamentary delegates will hereafter beby specific administrative districts and will be subject to recall if they do not perform adequately. The reform, which stipulatesumber ofmay standiven soat, will not basically weaken the party's control, since allmust "represent the program of the Patriotic People's Front, without exception, as well as the policy of
delegates had been selected by the executive con-mittees of th-local party organizations.
Kconoroic Problems and Reform
Serious economic problems have obliged the regime toan economic reformnnd the congress willon the variousof the program as well as tho "leading role of the party" in implementing them.
The ERP was approved by the central committee last Kay, and is marked by the cautiousness characteristic of the Kadar Ihe FPP was madeby stagnation in the rate of oconocic growth. This was in part the result of excessiveto detail in planning and of unimaginative concentration on meeting quantitative goals.
for Congress
Also indicative of Kadar'a efforts to liberalize and broaden participation in party andaffairs arc thefor tha congrcttu, which have been under way since Hay.eparture from traditional procedure, nominating committees, after consultation with party members, drew up lists offor local offices and for delegates to the party congress. The nominees were then approved at meetings of local partyin September and October. Formerly, those candidates and
umber of years after the revolt the regime, for reasons,ise in the standard of livingate the economy could no longer Retrenchment began two years agoew labor code which increased work norms, work rules, and caused some reallocation of workers. Last year the regimeeries of increases in prices and payroll deductions for pensions. First it denied that price increases would take place. Then, itthem late in Decemberpublishing specific details.
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These moves, although Justified by the economic situation, caused much grumbling and apprehension among the people. There arethat additional adjustments are necessary, and as recently as6 the regime felt it necessary to reassure theby stating that "decreases in the standard of living will not be permitted."
The ERP is in its formatLve stagers. Tho reform calls for more autonomy in enterprises to facilitate an improvement in both economic management and Nevertheless, it appears that centralized direction of tho economy will continue to be stressed in the next few years withimited role for the operation of market forces.
cultural management, internal trade, and labor management.
The planners are currently formulating the ERP, as wellive-year planhich emphasizes the same goals, but the regime does not claim that either willanacea foreconomic problems. the regime has not yethow to put theof the new plan into It is certain, however, that unless the party is willing to guide rather than rigidlyeconomic management, tho operation of the economy will not improve enough to enable the goals of the program to be achieved. Meanwhile, until the ERP is wall under way, it appears thatin the econoey will proceed rather slowly.
commissions havereforms in economic problear areas and these recommendations have been debatod extensively. Some proposals have beenexperimentally in selected Industries, and these trials are slated to continue through next year. Tho ERP will be introduced officiallynd will be followedwo-year period of adjustment.
Although several of the principles and laws necessary to implement the reform have been prepared, few of the details are available. Some innovations have already been introduced in agri-
"Leading Role of the Party"
A less pervasive role for the party in economic management is implicit in the new economic reform prograra. This hes led to considerable confusion and debate as to what, precisely, the party's role will be after the reform is woll along. To help answer this, the congress will discuss what the regime callB the "loading rolo of tho party." This phrase means simply that the party,uide, must persuade the entire population to carry out both state and party directives.
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In answer to critics who charge that the party's role is impaired by reliance on nonpartyadar has merely asserted that the function of parly cells in plant organizations will become increasingly Important in economic reform since "enterprise autonomy demands greater partyadar praises the alliance between the party and the "nonpartywho support party policies and goals. He haa told those who got their jobs by virtue of party affiliation, rather than ability, that the regime is confident they will be able to adapt to new
Party Statute Changes
The congress will modify the party statutes in order to allow the party to function effectively under the conditions produced by the economic reform.
In an effort to make party membership more flexible andtho congress willthat "before any decisionto his work or to hisIsember may express hisassuring the card-carrying technocrat of the right to use his head when an ideological approach is impractical.
The congress may alsoevision in the constitutionalconcerning major party meetings,lan will bewhereby the partymay callational party meeting between two congresses to draw up an interim suinmary of the experiences gained inof the previous congress' resolutions. Since the executive organs now supervise the financial and administrative affairs of the party, some of the auditingwill be eliminated.
Perhaps the most noteworthy revision to be discussed at the congress is the need for tore precise definition of the functions of the tophis became necessary because of the uncertainty that prevails in regard to individualwithin the party hierarchy.
Personnel Shifts
Some resistance to Kadar's policies exists among middle and lower level party and government functionaries even though thehas been stabilized by tho gradual elimination of extremist elements in the partyumber of personnel shifts are expected during tho congress, mainly to bring forth younger, more cooperative supporters of Kadar's middle course. There is some ovldence of this already. Since Kay new first secretaries have been "elected" in seven of Hungary'sounty partyand some of these shifts were allegedly made to "strengthen the party before tho ninth
Changes in tho partyinclude tho rrroval ofIstvan Dobi,wn" hag long^Drir*rT^^
ripS for retirement, and Jeno Pock, Hungary's economic czar who will reportedly be made the
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"sc.ipugoat" for the presentdifficulties. Some of the older members of the regimeas politburo stetobar Ferencalso befrom public life.
Foreign Policy
Foreign policy will probably not figure importantly during the congress. Kadar's liberalization, especially the amnesty ofprisonersas ledormalization of Hungary's status in the united Nations and anin its relations with the US. Hungary has beenexpanding its diplomatic, cultural, and economic relations with both Communist andcountries. Last year, whilelearcutof continued support for the USSR, the regime again expressed an interest in expanding itswith the West aa well at in extending its relations with the newly emerging and nonaligned nations.
Budapest in recent months has apparently been giving someattention to developing national positions. There is some indication, for example, that it may be interested infull diplomaticwith West Germany in the near future.
outlook
Since the party plans to have its ninth congress celebrate the success of Kadar's "middle-of-the-road" socialism during the last ten years, there is no reason to expect major policy changes. Discussion of the economicprogram will probably raise as many questions as it attempts to answer, and, since the reform does not go into effectny substantive provisions will probably beto later revision. The Kadar regime, optimistic and stable, will probably continue tolthough with the sameavenues of "socialist democratism" in an effort topopular support of ita l urccBMl
Original document.
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